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Introduction	  	    There	  is	  no	  question	  in	  the	  international	  theory	  discourse	  that	  there	  is	  a	  delicate	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Russia	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Vladimir	  Putin.	  Since	  his	  first	  rise	  to	  power	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  Putin	  and	  his	  rule	  of	  Russia	  have	  been	  the	  focus	  points	  for	  many	  different	  field	  of	  study	  from	  international	  conflict	  to	  Cold	  War	  theorists.	  Nonetheless,	  there	  is	  a	  general	  consensus	  within	  the	  varying	  fields	  that	  study	  Putin	  that	  there	  is	  tension	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Putin’s	  Russia.	   	   The	  big	  question	  is	  this:	  why?	  Unfortunately	  the	  question	  “why”	  seldom,	  if	  every,	  has	  a	  simple	  answer.	  Consequently,	  trying	  to	  understand	  why	  Putin	  runs	  Russia	  the	  way	  he	  does	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  question	  to	  answer.	  Like	  many	  other	  complicated	  answers,	  there	  is	  no	  one	  reason	  why	  Putin	  has	  applied	  the	  methods	  that	  he	  has	  during	  his	  presidencies.	  Rather,	  there	  are	  a	  multitude	  of	  elements	  that	  play	  into	  how	  Russia	  has	  functioned	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  century:	  Putin’s	  Background,	  security	  efforts,	  and	  historical	  context	  and	  institutional	  background.	  All	  three	  of	  these	  elements	  have	  come	  together	  to	  create	  the	  leader	  and	  situations	  that	  we	  know	  today.	   	   First,	  Putin’s	  background	  is	  a	  large	  player	  in	  how	  the	  United	  States	  and	  most	  others	  view	  Putin	  and	  his	  control	  over	  Russia.	  Putin	  comes	  from	  a	  varied	  background	  that	  includes	  years	  of	  service	  in	  both	  the	  KGB	  and	  its	  successors	  (Bacon	  et	  al).	  Furthermore,	  Putin	  has	  been	  both	  glamorized	  and	  vilified	  by	  the	  media.	  In	  recent	  months,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  2014	  Sochi	  Olympics	  and	  the	  ever-­‐growing	  tension	  in	  the	  Ukraine,	  Putin	  has	  been	  the	  cover	  of	  many	  tongue-­‐in-­‐cheek	  periodical	  covers	  such	  as	  the	  February	  1st	  issue	  of	  the	  Economist,	  and	  the	  similar	  cover	  of	  that	  week’s	  New	  Yorker,	  or	  there	  is	  also	  the	  March	  3rd	  cover	  of	  the	  sensationalist	  UK	  publication,	  The	  Sun,	  who	  published	  a	  bare	  chested	  Putin	  on	  the	  front	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(see	  appendix	  for	  images).	   The	  second	  factor	  at	  play	  is	  the	  path	  of	  securitization	  efforts	  the	  Putin	  is	  implementing	  in	  Russian	  politics.	  Barry	  Buzan,	  a	  main	  theorist	  of	  Securitization	  states	  that	  security	  is	  the	  following:	  "Security	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  about	  the	  pursuit	  of	  freedom	  from	  threat	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  states	  and	  societies	  to	  maintain	  their	  independent	  identity	  and	  their	  functional	  integrity	  against	  forces	  of	  change	  which	  they	  see	  as	  hostile,"	  (“New	  Patterns”	  432).	  This	  paper	  will	  look	  at	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  Putin	  has	  reacted	  to	  threats	  of	  security	  and	  how	  he	  has	  implemented	  changes	  that	  reveal	  his	  reactions.	  	   	  	   Third	  is	  an	  institutional	  background	  that	  predates	  Putin’s	  time	  in	  office	  of	  appointing	  former	  security	  agents	  into	  political	  positions.	  While	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  in	  the	  discourse	  surrounding	  Putin	  and	  his	  placement	  of	  former	  intelligence	  agents	  into	  positions	  of	  political	  power,	  Putin	  is	  not	  the	  first	  Russian	  leader	  to	  have	  done	  so.	  This	  paper	  will	  look	  at	  regimes	  that	  occurred	  before	  Putin’s	  and	  how	  their	  practices	  influenced	  Putin’s.	   	   This	  paper	  seeks	  to	  explain	  how	  these	  three	  elements,	  Putin’s	  Background,	  securitization,	  and	  the	  institutional	  background,	  have	  combined	  to	  make	  the	  Russia	  that	  we	  are	  familiar	  with	  today.	  It	  will	  focus	  specifically	  on	  how	  these	  three	  elements	  have	  affected	  the	  US-­‐Russian	  relationship	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  era,	  particularly	  the	  relationship	  between	  2000	  and	  2005.	  While	  the	  current	  atmosphere	  in	  Russia	  is	  one	  to	  consider,	  it	  will	  largely	  remain	  unaddressed	  in	  this	  paper,	  as	  it	  is	  larger	  than	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	  	   
Putin’s	  Background	   A	  simple	  Google	  search	  will	  turn	  up	  not	  only	  news	  on	  Putin	  and	  current	  affairs	  in	  Russia,	  but	  also	  lists	  of	  products	  named	  after	  him	  as	  well	  as	  bizarre	  media	  events	  such	  as	  Putin	  guiding	  lost	  cranes	  home.	  This	  so-­‐called	  cult	  of	  personality	  is	  troublesome	  for	  many,	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both	  for	  scholars	  on	  the	  topic	  and	  for	  casual	  observers.	  As	  previously	  stated,	  Putin	  is	  somewhat	  of	  a	  media	  star,	  yet	  not	  in	  the	  way	  that	  many	  politicians	  are,	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  larger-­‐than-­‐life	  character	  who	  populates	  the	  media	  with	  bizarre,	  at	  least	  to	  our	  western	  standards,	  news	  stories.	   Putin	  is	  much	  more	  in	  the	  limelight	  than	  many	  other	  foreign	  leaders	  are.	  Throughout	  the	  first	  months	  of	  2014,	  Putin’s	  image	  was	  plastered	  all	  over	  the	  world,	  from	  newspapers,	  magazines,	  and	  even	  on	  televisions.	  Though	  this	  was	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  Olympics,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  larger	  sense	  of	  political	  fame	  at	  play.	  Should	  you	  hop	  onto	  any	  myriad	  of	  internet	  websites,	  memes	  will	  come	  up	  linking	  him	  to	  numerous	  pop	  culture	  references,	  “Putin	  on	  a	  Ritz”,	  for	  example,	  to	  painted,	  old-­‐timey	  portraits	  with	  the	  phrase	  “Haters	  gonna	  die”.	  While	  this	  may	  seem	  like	  the	  typical	  fanfare	  that	  happens	  on	  the	  internet,	  it	  walks	  a	  fine	  line	  between	  activism	  and	  being	  a	  joke.	   	  	   Putin	  has	  been	  in	  the	  spotlight	  for	  years,	  and	  was	  even	  Time	  Magazine’s	  Person	  of	  the	  Year	  in	  2007,	  and	  therefore	  the	  internet	  is	  not	  where	  Putin’s	  legacy	  ends.	  Various	  companies	  have	  named	  their	  products	  after	  Putin,	  including	  vodka	  brands.	  In	  fact,	  he	  has	  even	  had	  comics	  made	  about	  him,	  featuring	  himself	  and	  co-­‐leader	  Dmitry	  Medvedev.	  Additionally,	  Putin	  has	  played	  into	  this	  caricature	  and	  in	  2010	  asked	  the	  country	  of	  Russia	  to	  help	  him	  name	  his	  new	  puppy	  –	  the	  ending	  name	  was	  eventually	  “Buffy.”	   For	  those	  of	  us	  who	  are	  indeed	  looking	  at	  Putin	  from	  a	  western	  perspective,	  it	  leaves	  a	  strange	  taste	  in	  our	  mouths.	  While	  we	  are	  certainly	  used	  to	  looking	  at	  politicians	  through	  mocking	  lenses,	  Putin	  is	  almost	  too	  absurd	  to	  mock.	  His	  larger-­‐than-­‐life	  persona	  has	  left	  us	  western	  viewers	  with	  images	  of	  a	  man	  who	  swims	  with	  dolphins,	  hangs	  out	  with	  world	  renowned	  martial	  artist,	  and	  yet	  one	  which	  he	  believe	  is	  violating	  basic	  human	  rights.	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However,	  more	  digging	  will	  provide	  some	  interesting	  background	  information	  on	  Putin.	  His	  approval	  rating,	  at	  least	  during	  his	  first	  term	  as	  President	  (2000-­‐2004),	  never	  dropped	  below	  60%	  -­‐	  a	  feat	  that	  is	  almost	  unheard	  of	  in	  modern	  day	  politics	  (White	  and	  McAlister	  613).	  Furthermore,	  White	  and	  McAlister	  have	  also	  referred	  to	  him	  as	  “Super	  President”	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  has,	  essentially,	  been	  in	  charge	  of	  Russia	  for	  thirteen	  year	  now	  (White	  and	  McAlister	  604).	  The	  term	  “Super	  President”	  also	  refers	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Putin	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  all	  of	  the	  main	  decisions	  and	  policies	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Russian	  government	  (White	  and	  McAlister	  604).	   Not	  only	  is	  Putin	  commonly	  thought	  of	  as	  holding	  exuberant	  power	  in	  present	  day	  Russia,	  but	  he	  was	  also	  a	  player	  within	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Putin	  from	  a	  very	  young	  age	  had	  decided	  that	  he	  wanted	  to	  be	  a	  spy	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  it	  was	  a	  goal	  that	  he	  ultimately	  reached	  (Bacon	  et	  al,	  30-­‐2).	  Putin	  served	  as	  a	  low-­‐ranking	  agent	  who	  worked	  under	  the	  KGB	  in	  East	  Germany	  (Bacon	  et	  al,	  30-­‐32).	  After	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Putin	  was	  able	  to	  secure	  himself	  a	  spot	  at	  the	  head	  of	  the	  FSB	  -­‐	  the	  successor	  of	  the	  KGB	  (Colton	  and	  McFaul	  8).	  This	  position	  was	  an	  appointment	  made	  by	  then	  President	  -­‐	  Boris	  Yeltsin,	  who,	  less	  than	  a	  year	  later	  appointed	  Putin	  to	  be	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Russia	  (Colton	  and	  McFaul	  8).	  Since	  his	  first	  election	  in	  office	  in	  the	  year	  2000,	  it	  has	  been	  widely	  reported	  that	  many	  of	  those	  Putin	  is	  working	  with	  are	  former	  colleagues	  from	  this	  KGB	  days.	  Academic	  reports	  argue	  that	  at	  least	  50%	  of	  his	  first	  cabinet	  was	  composed	  of	  former	  Soviet	  colleagues,	  but	  since	  many	  KGB	  records	  are	  still	  private	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  find	  an	  accurate	  count	  (Starr	  1).	   	   Furthermore,	  Putin’s	  exaltation	  of	  the	  FSB	  in	  modern	  Russia	  has	  been	  a	  hot	  topic	  for	  many	  academics	  looking	  at	  Putin’s	  effect	  on	  Russia,	  and	  has	  even	  been	  called	  Russia’s	  “new	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nobility”	  by	  their	  own	  director	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  80).	  Since	  he	  first	  took	  the	  presidential	  office,	  the	  FSB	  has	  become	  exponentially	  more	  important	  to	  Russia	  and	  its	  success	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  96).	  Putin	  has	  also	  been	  outspoken	  about	  his	  trust	  for	  the	  FSB	  over	  other	  government	  agencies	  in	  Russia	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  96).	   
	  	   Since	  his	  first	  term	  as	  president	  Putin	  has	  played	  a	  large	  role	  in	  the	  changes	  that	  have	  given	  the	  FSB	  their	  current	  status	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  96).	  While	  the	  former	  KGB	  was	  split	  into	  multiple	  agencies	  by	  Yeltsin,	  Putin	  has	  merged	  those	  agencies	  to	  form	  what	  is	  currently	  the	  FSB	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  83-­‐5).	  Additionally,	  Putin	  has	  made	  several	  institutional	  changes	  including	  changing	  the	  FSB	  uniform	  to	  black	  –	  a	  move	  which	  lies	  in	  historical	  references	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  86).	   	   However,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  interesting	  detail	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  FSB	  seems	  to	  supersede	  the	  power	  levels	  that	  the	  KGB	  ever	  had.	  While,	  as	  noted	  earlier,	  the	  KGB	  were	  not	  given	  much	  oversight,	  it	  still	  had	  to	  obey	  certain	  political	  structures	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  81).	  The	  same	  is	  not	  true	  about	  the	  FSB,	  as	  it	  far	  more	  secretive	  and	  closed	  off	  than	  the	  KGB	  ever	  was	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  81).	  They	  are	  supposedly	  behind	  spying	  on	  and	  sabotaging	  several	  journalists	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  functioning	  with	  regards	  to	  Russia	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  81).	  	  Additionally,	  it	  has	  become	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  providers	  of	  future	  state	  workers	  (Soldatov	  and	  Boragan).	  	  	  	   Under	  Putin’s	  first	  term	  the	  FSB’s	  power	  was	  heighted	  as	  Putin	  believed	  them	  to	  be	  the	  only	  government	  agency	  he	  could	  truly	  trust	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  81).	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  FSB	  became	  the	  main	  enforcer	  of	  Kremlin	  rule	  and	  the	  main	  protectors	  of	  the	  Kremlin	  –	  a	  role	  that	  surpasses	  the	  duties	  of	  the	  KGB	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  81).	  Additionally,	  they	  have	  been	  accused	  intimidating	  political	  and	  scientific	  communities	  to	  force	  them	  to	  stay	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quiet	  on	  specific	  topics	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  81).	  	  While	  some	  people	  liken	  this	  to	  the	  KGB,	  it	  is	  actually	  far	  more	  extreme	  than	  the	  KGB	  was	  and	  more	  closely	  relates	  to	  secret	  police	  who	  protect	  regimes	  in	  middle	  eastern	  countries	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  81-­‐2).	   
	   While	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  undeniable	  proof	  that	  Putin	  has	  placed	  an	  emphasis	  on	  security	  and	  espionage	  organizations	  during	  his	  reign,	  there	  is	  some	  argument	  on	  if	  his	  own	  background	  is	  responsible	  for	  it.	  While	  Putin	  served	  for	  over	  a	  decade	  in	  the	  KGB,	  he	  was	  never	  a	  particularly	  high-­‐ranking	  member	  of	  the	  office	  (Bacon	  et	  al	  32).	  Furthermore,	  Putin	  was	  the	  head	  of	  the	  FSB	  for	  less	  than	  a	  year	  before	  being	  promoted	  to	  Prime	  Minister	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  85).	  This	  had	  led	  scholars	  to	  argue	  that	  his	  past	  is	  not	  his	  motivation	  for	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  FSB	  citing	  that	  he	  does	  not	  have	  enough	  time	  experience	  in	  the	  secretive	  services	  for	  it	  to	  affect	  his	  view	  on	  security	  (Bacon	  et	  al	  31).	  Additionally,	  there	  are	  those	  who	  argue	  that	  while	  he	  worked	  for	  the	  KGB,	  the	  majority	  of	  his	  service	  was	  spent	  in	  other	  countries,	  and	  thus	  he	  was	  never	  full	  exposed	  to	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  KGB	  within	  Russia	  (Bacon	  et	  al	  32).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  even	  though	  Putin	  spent	  time	  in	  both	  the	  KGB	  and	  FSB,	  the	  time	  was	  not	  substantial	  enough	  to	  create	  a	  bias	  towards	  those	  organizations.	   
Institutional	  background	   
	   When	  looking	  at	  Russia’s	  future	  it’s	  important	  to	  also	  look	  at	  what	  happened	  immediately	  after	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Though	  Putin	  has	  been	  in	  control	  for	  more	  than	  anyone	  else	  since	  the	  Cold	  War,	  there	  was	  nearly	  ten	  years	  of	  history	  that	  happened	  between	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  and	  the	  Putin’s	  rise	  to	  power.	  Understanding	  the	  institutional	  background	  is	  key	  in	  being	  able	  to	  fairly	  analyze	  the	  current	  state,	  as	  if	  you	  fail	  to	  look	  at	  the	  background,	  you	  fail	  to	  look	  at	  the	  full	  picture.	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   Though,	  as	  this	  paper	  has	  mentioned,	  the	  KGB	  was	  broken	  up	  when	  the	  Cold	  War	  ended,	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  those	  who	  had	  been	  in	  the	  KGB	  was	  exiled	  from	  society.	  In	  fact,	  many	  of	  them	  were	  embraced	  by	  the	  new,	  democratic	  Russia	  and	  found	  jobs	  under	  the	  leaders	  that	  occurred	  between	  the	  fall	  of	  Soviet	  Russia	  and	  Putin’s	  presidency	  (Bacon	  et	  al	  28).	  Yeltsin	  in	  particularly	  gave	  many	  former	  KGB	  agents	  places	  within	  this	  offices	  and	  cabinets	  -­‐	  including	  Putin	  himself	  (Bacon	  et	  al	  28).	  Furthermore,	  many	  of	  these	  men	  still	  hold	  high-­‐ranking	  positions	  in	  offices,	  and	  while	  this	  may	  be	  true,	  it’s	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  these	  men	  did	  not	  rise	  to	  these	  levels	  of	  power	  under	  Putin,	  but	  rather	  under	  his	  predecessors	  (Bacon	  et	  al	  28-­‐9).	   	   This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  Putin	  has	  not	  helped	  to	  further	  the	  process	  of	  securitization	  within	  Russia.	  As	  Bacon	  and	  his	  colleagues	  say	  in	  their	  book	  Securitizing	  Russia,	  Putin’s	  work	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  “acceleration	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  continuation,”	  (30).	  While	  Putin	  didn’t	  start	  the	  process,	  he	  has	  made	  in	  more	  effective	  and	  has	  brought	  it	  to	  new	  levels	  within	  post-­‐Soviet	  Russia.	  According	  to	  studies,	  Yeltsin	  had	  anywhere	  from	  11.2	  to	  17.4	  percent	  of	  his	  representatives	  come	  from	  a	  security	  background,	  but	  in	  2003,	  Putin’s	  level	  was	  at	  25.1	  percent	  (Bacon	  et	  al,	  30).	   However,	  there	  are	  some	  who	  argue	  that	  Putin’s	  placement	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  was	  orchestrated	  by	  Yeltsin	  in	  order	  to	  further	  this	  trend	  (Bacon	  et	  al,	  30).	  After	  Putin	  winning	  the	  presidency	  it	  was	  soon	  theorized	  that	  perhaps	  there	  was	  a	  reason	  that	  Yeltsin	  has	  picked	  Putin	  to	  be	  his	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  later	  primed	  him	  to	  be	  his	  successor	  (Bacon	  et	  al,	  30).	  This	  was	  fueled	  by	  the	  thought,	  which	  ended	  coming	  to	  realization,	  that	  Putin	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  continue	  Yeltsin’s	  trend	  of	  appointing	  former	  security	  agents	  (Bacon	  et	  al	  30).	  	  What	  is	  notable,	  and	  viable,	  about	  this	  theory	  is	  that	  Yeltsin’s	  grooming	  of	  Putin	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happened	  at	  a	  time	  when	  US	  and	  Russian	  relations	  were	  at	  their	  most	  contentious	  during	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  era	  (Simes	  41).	  Fed	  up	  with	  the	  Clinton	  administrations	  treatment	  of	  Russia,	  Yeltsin	  pushed	  a	  new	  constitution	  through	  parliament	  that	  essentially	  made	  the	  President	  the	  largest	  holder	  of	  power	  (Simes	  41).	  This	  was	  immediately	  followed	  by	  Putin’s	  placement	  into	  the	  role	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  (Simes	  41).	   Furthermore,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  this	  Yeltsin	  wanted	  to	  create	  an	  authoritative	  Russia	  and	  that	  this	  is	  why	  he	  picked	  Putin	  to	  be	  his	  heir	  (Bacon	  et	  al	  30).	  It	  was	  believed	  to	  be	  a	  strategic	  move	  to	  further	  control	  of	  the	  country	  and	  return	  to	  a	  more	  authoritative	  state	  than	  Russia	  was	  experiencing	  (Bacon	  et	  al	  30).	  Criticism	  was	  high	  that	  it	  would	  too	  much	  focus	  was	  being	  placed	  on	  the	  military	  aspects	  of	  the	  country	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  political	  and	  civilian	  aspects	  of	  the	  country	  and	  that	  it	  marked	  dangerous	  territory	  for	  Russia	  to	  go	  into	  it	  (Bacon	  et	  al,	  30).	  	   While	  some	  may	  argue	  that	  these	  fear	  and	  assessment	  were	  valid,	  there	  are	  still	  other	  things	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  when	  looking	  at	  how	  Putin	  has	  continued	  what	  Yeltsin	  started,	  and	  it	  is	  still	  important	  to	  look	  at	  other	  theories	  besides	  authoritarianism.	  Bacon	  and	  his	  colleagues	  make	  the	  point	  that	  while	  these	  people	  came	  from	  a	  security	  background	  that	  doesn’t	  automatically	  mean	  that	  they	  will	  have	  a	  security	  bias	  (30).	  Additionally,	  if	  you	  prescribe	  to	  that	  point	  of	  view	  than	  you	  have	  to	  also	  believe	  that	  anyone	  else	  from	  comes	  from	  a	  non-­‐political	  background	  will	  be	  strictly	  bias	  based	  on	  whatever	  other	  background	  that	  they	  come	  from.	  	    
Securitization	   	   	   Securitization	  is	  a	  theory	  on	  international	  relations	  that	  was	  created	  by	  the	  Copenhagen	  School	  (CS)	  and	  focuses	  on	  expanding	  the	  meaning	  of	  security	  to	  include	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threats	  that	  do	  not	  fit	  into	  the	  general	  security	  mindset,	  (Buzan,	  “Macrosecuritisation…”	  254).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  securitization	  focuses	  on	  threats	  that	  are	  non-­‐traditional	  in	  the	  way	  that	  they	  are	  not	  based	  in	  what	  has	  historically	  been	  thought	  of	  as	  state	  security.	  This	  means	  that	  states,	  in	  many	  ways,	  use	  security	  to	  support	  their	  autonomy,	  authority,	  and	  sovereignty.	  Furthermore,	  it	  implies	  that	  states	  are	  the	  sole	  deciders	  of	  who,	  or	  what,	  is	  challenging	  or	  threatening	  their	  autonomy.	  	  	  	   What	  makes	  securitization	  so	  unique	  in	  theory	  is	  the	  instances	  that	  this	  security	  does	  not	  just	  have	  to	  come	  from	  a	  military	  perspective,	  but	  rather	  all	  aspects	  of	  a	  state	  could	  be	  securitized	  (Buzan	  “Rethinking…”	  6).	  	  This	  includes	  everything	  from	  the	  economy	  to	  climate	  change	  and	  often	  varies	  from	  state	  to	  state	  (Buzan	  “Rethinking…”	  11-­‐12).In	  addition,	  the	  securitization	  of	  these	  non-­‐military	  features	  of	  states	  has	  only	  increased	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  bipolarity	  in	  the	  world’s	  major	  players	  (Buzan	  “Rethinking…”	  8).	  In	  other	  words,	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  Soviet	  Russia,	  the	  world	  returned	  to	  a	  semi-­‐hegemonic	  power	  system	  that	  allowed	  states	  to	  focus	  more	  on	  non-­‐military	  aspects	  of	  security.	  Because	  of	  the	  lessened	  tension	  between	  capitalism	  and	  communism,	  state	  are	  now	  focusing	  on	  more	  on	  their	  non-­‐military	  efforts.	  	  	  	   Additionally,	  according	  to	  CS	  there	  are	  different	  levels	  on	  which	  securitization	  can	  occur	  and	  this	  often	  predicts	  how	  essential	  and	  successful	  a	  securitization	  movement	  will	  be	  (Buzan,	  “Macrosecuritisation…”	  255).	  Micro	  securitization	  refers	  to	  small	  groups	  and	  individuals	  who	  seek	  to	  implement	  security	  efforts,	  though	  they	  are	  rarely	  successful	  (Buzan,	  “Macrosecuritisation…”	  255).	  	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  scale	  there	  is	  a	  movement	  called	  “system-­‐level”	  that	  argues	  that	  all	  of	  humanity	  should	  be	  a	  securitization	  effort	  ((Buzan,	  “Macrosecuritisation…”	  254).	  	  Between	  the	  two	  sits	  the	  middle	  level	  which	  focuses	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on	  individual	  states	  and	  nations,	  and	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  the	  most	  successful	  form	  of	  securitization	  to	  date	  (Buzan,	  “Macrosecuritisation…”	  255).	  Though	  all	  three	  levels	  of	  securitization	  have	  their	  place	  in	  a	  dialogue	  on	  international	  studies,	  the	  middle	  level	  is	  the	  most	  common	  and	  the	  one	  with	  the	  most	  relevance	  to	  this	  paper.	  	  	   There	  are	  several	  arguments	  on	  why	  the	  middle	  level	  of	  securitization	  has	  been	  more	  successful	  than	  the	  micro	  and	  system	  levels.	  For	  one,	  middle	  level	  securitization	  focuses	  on	  a	  large,	  targeted	  group.	  Since	  middle	  level	  is	  focused	  on	  a	  specific	  state	  or	  group,	  that	  specific	  group	  that	  can	  come	  together	  and	  warrant	  protection,	  giving	  the	  security	  efforts	  validation	  (Buzan,	  “Macrosecuritisation…”	  255).	  As	  Buzan	  notes,	  part	  of	  what	  makes	  middle	  level	  securitization	  so	  successful	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  “we”	  being	  used	  (Buzan,	  “Macrosecuritisation…”	  255).	  By	  using	  this	  word	  it	  creates	  a	  since	  of	  community	  that	  gives	  validation	  to	  the	  security	  efforts.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  micro	  level	  is	  too	  specific	  and	  has	  a	  hard	  time	  garnering	  support	  (Buzan,	  “Macrosecuritisation…”	  255).	  	  System	  level	  securitization	  faces	  a	  similar	  problem,	  but	  instead	  is	  too	  broad	  to	  invoke	  a	  sense	  of	  community	  (Buzan,	  “Macrosecuritisation…”	  255).	  	  	  	   It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  in	  all	  of	  this	  that	  power	  remains	  a	  key	  issue.	  As	  securitization	  focuses	  on	  international	  security	  as	  opposed	  to	  national	  security,	  power	  is	  a	  large	  issue	  at	  stake	  (Buzan	  “Rethinking…”	  13).	  This	  means	  that	  securitization	  focuses	  on	  the	  nation’s	  role	  in	  the	  international	  realm	  as	  opposed	  to	  focusing	  on	  events	  within	  the	  nation’s	  boundaries.	  Since	  it	  is	  about	  power,	  it	  becomes	  about	  survival	  and	  being	  able	  to	  assert	  your	  powers	  to	  insure	  your	  survival	  (Buzan	  “Rethinking…”	  13).	  	  Thus,	  in	  our	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  society,	  it	  has	  become	  increasingly	  important	  to	  be	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  your	  power	  in	  as	  many	  ways	  possible	  as	  well	  as	  be	  able	  to	  protect	  that	  power.	  This	  is	  what	  leads	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to	  the	  view	  of	  expanding	  security.	  	  	   One	  place	  that	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  this	  power	  balance	  is	  when	  two	  countries	  have	  different	  views	  on	  the	  same	  topic	  of	  securitization.	  The	  Cold	  War	  is	  a	  great	  example	  of	  this	  as	  it	  was	  a	  battle	  of	  two	  competing	  ideologies	  to	  see	  who	  had	  the	  upper	  hand	  (Buzan,	  “Macrosecuritisation…”	  258).	  Both	  the	  US	  and	  USSR	  had	  strong	  feelings	  about	  their	  governance	  style	  (capitalism	  vs.	  communism),	  and	  because	  of	  it	  there	  was	  a	  battle	  of	  power	  between	  the	  two	  nations.	  However,	  there	  are	  also	  occurrences	  where	  countries	  can	  agree	  on	  global	  issue	  	  (Buzan,	  “Macrosecuritisation…”	  258-­‐9).	  	  	   Overall,	  securitization	  is	  a	  method	  of	  securitizing	  non-­‐military	  sectors,	  while	  in	  a	  rapidly	  changing	  post-­‐Cold-­‐war	  society.	  While	  there	  are	  proponents	  for	  system	  level	  securitization	  to	  focus	  on	  all	  of	  humanity,	  it	  is	  far	  more	  common	  for	  securitization	  to	  occur	  on	  a	  state-­‐to-­‐state	  level.	  Because	  of	  the	  preponderance	  of	  securitization	  issues	  varying	  from	  state	  to	  state	  it	  is	  common	  for	  securitization	  efforts	  to	  result	  in	  the	  a	  power	  struggle	  between	  two	  different	  nations	  	  
Securitization	  within	  Putin’s	  Russia When	  looking	  at	  Putin’s	  control	  of	  Russia,	  it’s	  not	  too	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  Putin	  is	  securitizing	  the	  nation	  that	  he	  has	  ruled	  for	  over	  thirteen	  years.	  There	  have	  been	  several	  changes	  that	  have	  happened	  under	  Putin’s	  regime	  that	  have	  affected	  the	  nation	  and	  particularly	  its	  security	  state.	  These	  expand	  past	  the	  expansion	  and	  strengthening	  of	  the	  FSB,	  and	  can	  even	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  current	  crisis	  between	  Russia	  and	  the	  Ukraine.	   	   The	  first	  of	  these	  is	  the	  expansion	  of	  Russia’s	  Federal	  Security	  Service	  (FSB),	  a	  direct	  descendant	  of	  the	  KGB.	  Since	  he	  was	  first	  appointed	  the	  head	  of	  the	  FBS	  in	  1999,	  the	  power	  that	  the	  institution	  has	  gained	  could	  be	  described	  as	  exponential.	  As	  has	  been	  discussed,	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under	  Putin	  the	  FSB	  has	  become	  the	  largest	  security	  agent	  in	  Russia,	  and	  has	  been	  granted	  large	  amounts	  of	  power	  with	  little,	  if	  any	  oversight	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borogan	  81).	  They	  are	  said	  to	  have,	  “….	  been	  granted	  the	  role	  of	  the	  new	  elite,	  enjoying	  expanded	  responsibility	  and	  immunity	  from	  public	  oversight	  or	  parliamentary	  control,”	  which	  as	  I’ve	  noted,	  is	  quite	  different	  than	  the	  policies	  that	  the	  KGB	  was	  held	  to	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borogan	  80-­‐1).	   	   This	  aligns	  with	  the	  CS	  theories	  on	  securitization	  as	  Putin	  has	  placed	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  control	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  non-­‐militarized	  party.	  While	  espionage	  is	  indeed	  part	  of	  a	  securitized	  state	  and	  can	  be	  part	  of	  militarization,	  the	  FSB	  still	  transcends	  that	  concrete	  military	  focus.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  FSB	  has	  power	  isn’t	  the	  only	  important	  aspect,	  however,	  and	  it’s	  important	  to	  look	  at	  why	  the	  FSB	  has	  been	  granted	  so	  much	  power	  and	  what	  they	  are	  doing	  with	  it.	   	   Richard	  Sakwa,	  an	  expert	  in	  post-­‐Soviet	  Russia,	  has	  asserted	  that	  Putin	  is	  aiming	  to	  once	  again	  make	  Russia	  a	  great	  power	  (210).	  While	  Russia	  is	  certainly	  a	  key	  player	  in	  the	  global	  world	  today,	  they	  are	  not	  the	  empire	  that	  they	  were	  before	  the	  Bolsheviks,	  nor	  does	  it	  hold	  the	  power	  the	  USSR	  held	  either	  (Sakwa	  210).	  Essentially,	  Russia	  is	  at	  its	  least	  powerful	  point	  than	  it	  has	  been	  in	  nearly	  three	  hundred	  years.	  Or	  at	  least	  that	  is	  how	  the	  world	  perceives	  it.	  Furthermore,	  according	  to	  Sakaw,	  the	  Russia	  that	  emerged	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  essentially	  a	  new	  country	  that	  had	  never	  before	  existed	  (210).	  While	  Russia	  may	  have	  been	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  Russian	  Empire	  (during	  imperialist	  rule)	  its	  boundaries	  stretched	  far	  wider	  than	  they	  did	  today	  (Sakwa	  2010).	   	   This	  leaves	  Putin	  in	  a	  delicate	  place,	  and	  it	  is	  indeed	  something	  that	  has	  been	  reflected	  in	  terms	  of	  his	  expansion	  of	  powers,	  particularly	  in	  changes	  within	  the	  FSB.	  When	  Putin	  changed	  the	  FSB	  uniforms	  to	  the	  color	  black	  it	  held	  a	  significant	  historical	  purpose,	  as	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(Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  86).	  During	  the	  Russian	  Civil	  War	  the	  White	  Army	  (fighting	  against	  the	  Bolsheviks)	  created	  new	  units	  that	  dressed	  their	  soldiers	  in	  black	  uniforms	  similar	  to	  the	  ones	  that	  Putin	  assigned	  to	  the	  FSB	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  86).	  This	  is	  not	  the	  only	  place	  where	  the	  FSB	  has	  returned	  to	  imperialist	  Russian	  customs,	  however.	  Since	  Putin’s	  time	  in	  Office,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  rekindling	  of	  the	  Kremlin	  and	  Orthodox	  church	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  86).	  Additional,	  they	  see	  themselves	  as	  the	  heirs	  not	  only	  to	  the	  KRB	  but	  also	  to	  the	  secret	  police	  that	  the	  tsars	  deployed	  to	  battle	  political	  terrorism,”	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  82).	   	   When	  looking	  at	  this	  evidence,	  it’s	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  Putin	  is	  trying	  to	  assert	  Russia’s	  power	  within	  the	  global	  community.	  Putin	  has	  clearly	  drawn	  inspiration	  from	  past	  great	  eras	  of	  Russian	  history	  in	  his	  attempts	  to	  securitize	  the	  nation.	  By	  changing	  the	  uniforms	  of	  the	  FSB	  and	  realigning	  the	  state	  with	  older	  policies,	  Putin	  is	  attempting	  to	  create	  an	  image	  of	  Russia	  that	  mimics	  its	  stronger	  past.	   	   Additionally,	  Putin	  also	  focuses	  back	  on	  this	  idea	  of	  non-­‐traditional	  threats	  securitization	  theory	  focuses	  on.	  It	  is	  said	  that	  the	  FSB.	  It	  is	  said	  that	  the	  FSB	  have	  been	  tasked	  with	  compiling	  a	  list	  of	  all	  potential	  “extremist”	  focusinging	  specifically	  on	  those	  within	  Russia	  as	  opposed	  to	  those	  abroad	  (Soldatov	  and	  Borgan	  90).	  Again,	  while	  this	  may	  seem	  like	  a	  standard	  effort,	  in	  many	  ways	  it’s	  really	  not.	  It	  ties	  in	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  power	  and	  taking	  a	  step	  back	  from	  global	  threats	  and	  looking	  at	  state	  interest.	  In	  a	  world	  where	  Putin’s	  Russia	  is	  highly	  politicised,	  there	  is	  a	  new	  level	  of	  threat,	  and	  it	  is	  easily	  arguable	  that	  these	  “extremists”	  are	  some	  of	  the	  individual	  players	  that	  take	  place	  in	  securitization.	  Furthermore,	  it	  would	  also	  be	  easy	  to	  argue	  that	  Putin	  is	  also	  acting	  as	  an	  individual	  player	  as	  opposed	  to	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  nation.	   
      Smolen  15	  
When	  looking	  at	  Sakwa’s	  assessment	  of	  Putin’s	  Russia,	  it	  also	  easily	  ties	  into	  the	  currently	  conflict	  between	  Russia	  and	  the	  Ukraine.	  Historically,	  the	  Ukraine	  has	  been	  a	  part	  of	  Russia	  since	  the	  seventeenth	  century,	  and	  both	  countries	  share	  cultural	  ties	  and	  many	  citizens	  speak	  both	  languages	  (Simes	  44).	  Yet,	  even	  when	  ignoring	  the	  long	  history	  between	  Russia	  and	  the	  Ukraine	  and	  just	  looking	  at	  the	  current	  situation	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  the	  current	  situation	  is	  a	  power	  play.	  	  As	  the	  development	  is	  so	  new,	  it’s	  impossible	  to	  find	  any	  scholarly	  research	  on	  the	  topic,	  but	  no	  matter	  what	  side	  you	  look	  at,	  there	  is	  tension.	  Whether	  or	  not	  Putin	  was	  asked	  to	  intervene	  by	  Ukrainian	  president,	  Putin	  is	  still	  asserting	  power,	  not	  only	  in	  Ukraine,	  but	  in	  the	  global	  field.	   Ultimately,	  that’s	  what	  Putin’s	  securitization	  of	  Russia	  is	  about:	  power.	  Bacon	  and	  his	  colleagues	  used	  the	  powerful	  quote	  that	  "the	  key	  issue	  is	  not	  democracy	  per	  se	  but	  control,"	  and	  indeed	  this	  is	  very	  accurate	  of	  the	  climate	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  Russia	  since	  Putin’s	  first	  term	  as	  president	  (18).	  Yet	  this	  does	  not	  make	  Putin’s	  Russia	  an	  authoritarian	  regime,	  but	  rather	  it	  ties	  back	  into	  Sakwa’s	  idea	  of	  trying	  to	  prove	  the	  strength	  of	  Russia	  (Bacon	  et	  al	  6,	  8).	   For	  Putin,	  the	  key	  issue	  is	  not	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  have	  a	  democracy	  or	  an	  authoritarian	  regime,	  but	  rather	  it’s	  about	  asserting	  Russia	  and	  showing	  the	  global	  community	  the	  power	  that	  Russia	  still	  holds	  (Bacon	  et	  al	  6).	  While	  the	  nineties	  showed	  a	  newly	  liberated	  state	  that	  was	  flush	  with	  democracy,	  Putin	  has	  brought	  that	  state	  back	  to	  a	  level	  in	  which	  it	  is	  developing	  as	  its	  own	  independent	  state	  with	  its	  own	  interests	  and	  security	  issues	  (Bacon	  et	  al,	  1-­‐4).	  In	  other	  words,	  Russia	  is	  still	  very	  much	  developing	  as	  a	  state,	  and	  because	  of	  this,	  Putin	  is	  less	  concerned	  with	  what	  kind	  of	  state	  is	  than	  how	  strong	  of	  a	  state	  it	  is.	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US-­Russian	  Relationship	   	   	  Since	  Putin	  has	  came	  to	  power	  there	  has	  been	  a	  tremendous	  change	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  Russia	  and	  the	  United	  States	  (Simes).	  	  After	  several	  years	  of	  impending	  collapse,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  formally	  disbanded	  on	  December	  26,	  1991.	  	  Initially,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  painted	  as	  a	  win	  for	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  conflict;	  after	  all,	  both	  countries	  had	  come	  together	  to	  overthrow	  communism	  (Simes	  37).	  	  But	  as	  time	  progressed,	  so	  did	  the	  negative	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  Both	  Presidents	  Clinton	  and	  George	  W.	  Bush	  have	  come	  under	  fire	  for	  mistreating	  Russia	  in	  a	  time	  of	  healing,	  Bush	  for	  not	  coming	  to	  economic	  aid	  and	  Clinton	  for	  exploiting	  Russia’s	  weakness	  and	  particularly	  abusing	  alcohol	  in	  negotiations	  (Simes	  39-­‐40).	  	  	   In	  the	  1990s	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Russia	  faced	  an	  economic	  crisis	  (Tikhomirov	  207,	  210).	  While	  Russia	  originally	  wanted	  to	  undergo	  a	  reform	  to	  increase	  economic	  stability,	  it	  ended	  up	  in	  a	  large	  economic	  crash	  that	  threatened	  the	  nation	  (Tikhomirov	  210).	  	  While	  there	  are	  many	  different	  theories	  on	  what	  caused	  the	  crash,	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  turn	  of	  events	  had	  an	  extreme	  of	  effect	  on	  Russia	  and	  its	  population.	  	  Between	  1990	  and	  1998	  unemployment	  in	  the	  country	  increased	  by	  19%	  while	  the	  GDP	  decreased	  by	  57%	  (Tikhomirov	  210).	  While	  both	  of	  these	  numbers	  are	  large,	  the	  decrease	  in	  the	  GDP	  should	  generally	  correlate	  to	  the	  rise	  in	  unemployment;	  in	  other	  words,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  nearly	  three	  times	  as	  much	  (Tikhomirov	  210).	  	  This	  economic	  crash	  put	  the	  already	  delicate	  country	  in	  an	  even	  more	  precarious	  place.	  	  	   Because	  of	  this,	  the	  United	  States	  thought	  that	  it	  could	  secure	  Russia	  as	  an	  ally	  without	  much	  work	  (Simes	  37).	  Both	  the	  Clinton	  and	  Bush	  administrations	  wanted	  to	  secure	  Russia	  as	  a	  diplomatic	  partner,	  yet	  neither	  administrations	  wanted	  to,	  nor	  expected	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to,	  put	  much	  work	  or	  effort	  into	  making	  that	  a	  reality	  (Simes	  37).	  While	  Clinton	  and	  his	  administration	  wanted	  to	  work	  closely	  with	  Yeltsin	  and	  the	  newly	  free	  Russia,	  they	  abused	  the	  situation	  to	  make	  the	  relationship	  they	  wanted,	  and	  not	  the	  relationship	  that	  was	  best	  for	  both	  countries	  involved	  (Simes	  40).	  This	  era	  was	  marked	  with	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  “feeding	  policies”	  to	  the	  Russian	  administration	  despite	  resentment	  from	  Russian	  officials	  (Simes	  40).	   Putin,	  however,	  marked	  a	  change	  in	  the	  trend	  of	  US	  abuse	  of	  Russia.	  While	  serving	  as	  Prime	  Minister,	  Putin	  suggested	  that	  Russia	  and	  the	  US	  team	  together	  to	  fight	  the	  war	  on	  terror,	  as	  both	  countries	  were	  struggling	  with	  al	  Qaeda	  and	  the	  Taliban	  (Simes	  42).	  However,	  Clinton	  and	  his	  administration	  denied	  the	  invitation	  believe	  that	  Russia	  was	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  undertake	  a	  challenge	  like	  that	  (Simes	  42-­‐3).	  Additionally,	  they	  accused	  Russia	  of	  trying	  to	  impose	  “neoimperialism”	  and	  trying	  to	  take	  state	  back	  under	  their	  wing,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  US	  was	  imposing	  a	  sphere	  of	  influence	  over	  as	  many	  former-­‐soviet	  states	  as	  they	  could	  (Simes	  43).	  When	  the	  Bush	  administration	  took	  office,	  they	  decided	  that	  Russia	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  priority	  of	  the	  US	  and	  distanced	  itself	  from	  the	  nation	  (Simes	  43).	  Though	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  on	  September	  11th	  helped	  increase	  cooperation	  between	  the	  US	  and	  Russia,	  tensions	  were	  still	  high.	  	  All	  of	  this	  has	  helped	  contribute	  to	  the	  delicate	  position	  that	  Russia	  and	  the	  United	  States	  stand	  on	  today.	  While	  Russia	  once	  needed	  the	  United	  States	  support,	  they	  have	  grown	  past	  that	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Putin	  and	  therefore	  Putin	  does	  not	  have	  to	  tread	  on	  the	  thin	  waters	  that	  his	  predecessors	  had	  to	  (Simes	  46).	  Rather,	  Putin	  is	  free	  to	  be	  skeptical	  of	  the	  US	  and	  to	  function	  outside	  of	  US	  critique	  (Simes	  47).	  Ultimately	  the	  US	  failed	  to	  take	  Putin	  seriously,	  yet	  also	  lost	  economic	  control,	  and	  thus	  lost	  any	  remaining	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support	  Russia	  would	  have	  needed	  from	  the	  US.	   Again	  this	  ties	  into	  the	  power	  that	  is	  important	  to	  securitization.	  While	  Putin	  attempted	  to	  create	  connections	  with	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  government	  he	  was	  ultimately	  denied,	  and	  thus	  he	  has	  not	  strived	  to	  better	  them	  now.	  Rather,	  he	  is	  showing	  that	  Russia	  is	  a	  power,	  despite	  what	  the	  US	  might	  think.	  This	  is	  something	  that,	  again,	  is	  present	  in	  the	  current	  surge	  of	  current	  struggles	  that	  Russia	  is	  facing.	  While	  there	  has	  been	  no	  lack	  of	  pressure	  from	  the	  United	  States	  government	  to	  back	  off,	  Putin	  sticks	  to	  his	  plan	  as	  opposed	  to	  giving	  in	  to	  the	  pressure.	   
	   We	  can	  also	  look	  at	  Putin’s	  New	  York	  Times	  op-­‐ed	  from	  September	  of	  2013	  in	  which	  he	  sends	  a	  please	  directly	  to	  the	  citizens	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  his	  piece,	  Putin	  urges	  citizens	  of	  the	  US	  to	  pressure	  Obama	  to	  halt	  intervention	  in	  Syria.	  Putin	  draws	  upon	  the	  war	  on	  terror	  with	  which	  he	  was	  wanted	  to	  fight	  with	  the	  US	  before.	  His	  closing	  paragraph	  goes	  as	  follows:	   
“My	  working	  and	  personal	  relationship	  with	  President	  Obama	  is	  marked	  
by	  growing	  trust.	  I	  appreciate	  this.	  I	  carefully	  studied	  his	  address	  to	  the	  
nation	  on	  Tuesday.	  And	  I	  would	  rather	  disagree	  with	  a	  case	  he	  made	  on	  
American	  exceptionalism,	  stating	  that	  the	  United	  States’	  policy	  is	  “what	  
makes	  America	  different.	  It’s	  what	  makes	  us	  exceptional.”	  It	  is	  extremely	  
dangerous	  to	  encourage	  people	  to	  see	  themselves	  as	  exceptional,	  
whatever	  the	  motivation.	  There	  are	  big	  countries	  and	  small	  countries,	  
rich	  and	  poor,	  those	  with	  long	  democratic	  traditions	  and	  those	  still	  
finding	  their	  way	  to	  democracy.	  Their	  policies	  differ,	  too.	  We	  are	  all	  
different,	  but	  when	  we	  ask	  for	  the	  Lord’s	  blessings,	  we	  must	  not	  forget	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that	  God	  created	  us	  equal.” This	  paragraph	  is	  interesting	  as	  it	  makes	  us	  question	  Putin’s	  intent.	  While	  the	  first	  part	  of	  his	  op-­‐ed	  talks	  about	  al	  Qaeda,	  the	  war	  on	  terror,	  Syria,	  and	  what	  it	  might	  mean	  for	  the	  UN,	  by	  the	  time	  we	  get	  to	  this	  paragraph	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  less	  about	  a	  global	  threat,	  but	  once	  again	  a	  threat	  between	  two	  countries.	   	   By	  including	  this	  rhetoric,	  Putin	  creates	  a	  dichotomy	  that	  stretches	  beyond	  conflicting	  views	  on	  the	  crisis	  of	  Syria.	  What	  it	  does	  do	  is	  increase	  the	  tension	  that	  has	  been	  lingering	  since	  the	  first	  few	  months	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  It	  pins	  nation	  against	  nation.	  Furthermore,	  it	  once	  again	  asserts	  Putin’s	  power,	  and	  specifically,	  his	  power	  over	  Obama.	  Instead	  of	  continuing	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  the	  president,	  Putin	  went	  direct	  to	  the	  source	  -­‐	  the	  citizens.	  	  
Putin	  and	  authoritarianism	   The	  question	  remains	  on	  if	  Putin’s	  Russia	  is	  an	  authoritarian	  regime.	  The	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  defines	  authoritarian	  as	  the	  following:	  “Favourable	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  authority	  as	  opposed	  to	  that	  of	  individual	  freedom.”	  While	  it’s	  easy	  to	  see	  where	  there	  are	  authoritarian	  principles	  in	  Putin’s,	  these	  events	  and	  factors	  can	  also	  be	  explained	  in	  other	  ways.	  Thus	  it	  is	  important	  to	  fully	  analyze	  the	  events	  that	  have	  occurred.	  	  	   The	  most	  common	  argument	  used	  for	  Putin’s	  supposed	  return	  to	  an	  authoritarian	  regime	  is	  his	  use	  of	  former	  security	  personnel	  within	  governmental	  positions	  that	  go	  beyond	  security.	  Yet,	  as	  we	  looked	  at	  earlier,	  this	  was	  not	  a	  precedent	  that	  Putin	  started.	  Additionally,	  it’s	  important	  to	  think	  about	  if	  their	  placement	  there	  is	  what	  makes	  it	  authoritarian	  of	  if	  it	  is	  the	  actions	  that	  come	  from	  their	  placement	  in	  the	  government.	  While	  these	  former	  security	  agents	  may	  be	  serving	  in	  Putin’s	  advisor	  and	  cabinet,	  they	  are	  only	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making	  up	  a	  quarter	  of	  that	  group.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  other	  three	  quarters	  does	  not	  come	  from	  the	  same	  background	  and	  thus	  it	  is	  logical	  and	  probable	  that	  Putin	  is	  getting	  advice	  from	  several	  different	  perspectives	  as	  opposed	  to	  just	  from	  a	  state	  security	  standpoint.	  	  Furthermore,	  Putin	  has	  the	  ultimate	  control	  of	  Russia	  -­‐	  not	  those	  in	  his	  cabinets.	  Going	  back	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  “super	  president”	  that	  White	  and	  McAlister	  talk	  about	  -­‐	  Putin	  has	  an	  exuberant	  amount	  of	  control	  over	  the	  country. 
Where	  this	  leaves	  Russia	   	   Ultimately,	  disagreeing	  with	  Russian	  policies,	  it’s	  hard	  to	  pin-­‐point	  if	  Russia	  is	  actually	  an	  authoritative	  state	  or	  not.	  However,	  there	  are	  many	  signs	  that	  point	  to	  the	  securitization	  of	  Russia,	  and	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  securitization	  is	  ultimately	  different	  from	  being	  an	  authoritarian	  regime,	  even	  if	  power	  is	  being	  evoked	  (Bacon	  et	  al,	  1).	  While	  there	  is	  certainly	  a	  power	  struggle	  at	  play,	  it	  is	  aimed	  at	  showing	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  international	  community	  that	  Russia	  is	  indeed	  a	  strong	  world	  power	  and	  player.	   	   Many	  of	  the	  actions	  that	  are	  labeled	  as	  authoritarian	  are	  actually	  Putin	  aiming	  to	  securitize	  Russia.	  When	  the	  Cold	  War	  ended,	  security	  changed	  on	  a	  global	  level	  and	  Russia	  was	  left	  in	  a	  weakened	  position.	  Since	  ascending	  into	  office	  Putin	  has	  been	  responding	  to	  the	  perceived	  threats.	  However,	  these	  threats	  are	  occurring	  in	  non-­‐traditional	  forms	  and	  because	  of	  this	  -­‐	  it	  appears	  that	  Putin	  is	  attempting	  to	  create	  an	  authoritarian	  regime.	   	   However,	  it	  is	  far	  more	  likely	  that	  Putin	  is	  trying	  to	  rebuild	  a	  strong	  nation.	  By	  responding	  to	  any	  and	  all	  perceived	  threats	  -­‐	  traditional	  or	  not	  -­‐	  Putin	  is	  helping	  to	  rebuild	  Russia’s	  perceived	  power.	  The	  more	  power	  Russia	  is	  perceived	  to	  have,	  the	  greater	  of	  a	  nation	  it	  becomes.	  Furthermore,	  the	  greater	  the	  nation	  becomes	  the	  more	  perceived	  threats	  go	  away.	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   Ultimately	  it	  comes	  down	  to	  Sakwa’s	  theory	  of	  Russia	  being	  the	  weakest	  it’s	  been	  in	  three	  centuries	  and	  securitization.	  By	  highly	  securitizing	  the	  country,	  Putin	  is	  able	  to	  respond	  to	  more	  threats	  and	  help	  build	  Russia	  into	  the	  empire	  that	  it	  once	  was.	  It	  is	  not	  about	  power	  over	  the	  country,	  but	  rather	  about	  becoming	  and	  proving	  a	  sense	  of	  global	  power.	  	  	   This	  can	  easily	  be	  seen	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  current	  conflict	  between	  Russia	  and	  the	  Ukraine.	  If	  Russia	  is	  not	  the	  power	  it	  once	  was,	  what	  better	  way	  to	  regain	  a	  sense	  of	  power	  than	  by	  intervening	  in	  another	  country's	  potential	  civil	  war.	  This	  not	  only	  asserts	  power	  over	  the	  Ukraine,	  but	  it	  also	  reminds	  other	  nations	  of	  the	  power	  that	  Russia	  has.	  This	  is	  particularly	  noticeable	  in	  the	  interactions	  between	  Putin	  and	  high-­‐ranking	  officials	  of	  the	  United	  States	  government.	  There	  has	  been	  no	  lack	  of	  criticism	  from	  the	  United	  States	  government,	  yet	  Putin	  fails	  to	  step	  down.	  This,	  again,	  creates	  a	  power-­‐dynamic	  between	  two	  major	  world	  players	  and	  helps	  solidify	  the	  potential	  power	  of	  Russia.	  	   The	  situation	  gets	  a	  little	  trickier	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  annexation	  of	  Crimea,	  and	  the	  possible	  annexation	  of	  Eastern	  Ukraine.	  While	  it	  may	  seem	  like	  a	  calculate	  move	  by	  Russia	  to	  gain	  more	  territory,	  the	  fact	  that	  Putin	  was	  so	  quick	  to	  annex	  Crimea,	  a	  section	  historically	  Russian,	  but	  remains	  silent	  on	  the	  rest	  of	  Eastern	  Ukraine	  is	  important.	  In	  many	  ways,	  it	  supports	  the	  accusations	  of	  this	  paper;	  it	  shows	  that	  Putin	  is	  trying	  to	  strengthen	  the	  power	  of	  Russia,	  it	  shows	  a	  response	  to	  perceived	  threats,	  and	  	  	   This	  means	  that	  Putin’s	  actions	  are	  a	  departure	  from	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  continuation	  of	  them.	  While	  some	  of	  the	  actions	  may	  be	  reminiscent	  of	  Soviet	  practices,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  look	  at	  why	  Putin	  is	  doing	  what	  he	  is	  doing.	  Where	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  seeking	  to	  hold	  power	  over	  their	  citizens,	  Putin	  is	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looking	  to	  assert	  the	  power	  of	  Russia	  in	  the	  global	  community.	   
Conclusion	   	   While	  the	  Cold	  War	  may	  have	  ended,	  the	  conflicts	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Russia	  are	  far	  from	  over.	  Though	  there	  was	  a	  period	  of	  joy	  between	  the	  two	  nations	  when	  the	  war	  first	  ended,	  the	  period	  was	  quickly	  distinguished	  by	  past	  US	  presidents	  failing	  to	  give	  Russia	  the	  recognition	  it	  deserved.	  Because	  of	  this,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  struggle	  within	  Russia	  to	  prove	  that	  it	  is	  indeed	  a	  powerful	  player	   	   These	  feelings	  are	  heightened	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  last	  several	  centuries	  of	  Russian	  history.	  For	  the	  first	  time	  in	  hundreds	  of	  years,	  Russia	  has	  become	  a	  country	  that	  is	  confined	  to	  its	  own	  borders.	  Before	  it	  was	  what	  we	  currently	  know	  as	  Russia	  -­‐	  it	  was	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  a	  set	  of	  states.	  Before	  it	  was	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  -­‐	  there	  was	  several	  centuries	  of	  the	  Russian	  Empire	  -­‐	  again,	  a	  series	  of	  states	  under	  rule	  of	  the	  Russian	  Tsar.	  Ultimately,	  Russia	  is	  it’s	  own	  state	  for	  the	  first	  time	  ever	  in	  modern	  history.	   	   Due	  to	  this	  newly	  formed	  state	  and	  the	  struggle	  for	  recognition	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  push	  to	  prove	  Russia’s	  power	  by	  Putin,	  and	  this	  push	  to	  prove	  Russia’s	  power	  is	  where	  we	  come	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  securitization.	  By	  trying	  to	  prove	  Russia’s	  power,	  Putin	  has	  securitized	  the	  Russian	  state	  to	  better	  respond	  to	  all	  possible	  threats.	  It	  is	  no	  longer	  about	  just	  the	  military;	  it	  is	  about	  protect	  Russia	  and	  asserting	  Russian	  power	  in	  any	  way	  possible.	   	   Yet,	  it	  is	  still	  dangerous	  for	  us	  to	  claim	  that	  this	  makes	  Putin	  an	  authoritarian	  leader.	  Rather,	  we	  must	  analyze	  the	  reason	  why	  he’s	  asserting	  power.	  It	  is	  not	  for	  personal	  gain,	  not	  to	  prove	  that	  he	  has	  power;	  but	  rather	  it	  is	  to	  prove	  that	  Russia	  has	  power,	  that	  Russia	  is	  a	  powerful	  nation	  without	  a	  league	  of	  other	  states	  behind	  it.	  Putin	  is	  seeking	  to	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